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NO PLACE TO GO, NO STORY TO TELL: THE
MISSING NARRATIVES OF THE SANCTUARY
MOVEMENT
TERESA GODWIN PHELPS*
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.' -
NAmTrvE AND nm LAW
The term narrative jurisprudence is becoming common parlance among
legal scholars, and as any term becomes widely used, it begins to take on
different meanings. Narrative jurisprudence may be used theoretically, as a
way of describing what law is. Robert Cover exemplifies this approach in
his well-known article Nomos and Narrative in which he writes that "law
and narrative are inseparably related. ' 2 By this he means that legal rules
and legal institutions are inevitably located in a narrative which gives those
rules and institutions meaning. Thus, in discussing the nature of law, one
must resort to the narrative in which that law is located. Robin West sees
narrative as a way of expanding one's vision and of better coming to see
the moral significance of legal theory.3 She applies this approach directly
to fictional narratives, using them as images of life against which legal
theory must be tested for validity. Narratives thus embody human situations
that measure the truthfulness of what we say about the law.4 Legal theory,
furthermore, depends upon narrative in that aspirational legal theorists
frequently create fictional utopian communities, complete with characters,
to depict the possibilities inherent in an alternative legal system.
5
Tom Shaffer sees narrative jurisprudence as encompassing both theory
and pedagogy and posits that narrative fictions make clear to us that law
is not merely theory, but has impact on people's lives. He claims that* we
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. University of
Notre Dame (B.A., 1973; M.A., 1975; Ph.D., 1980); Yale Law School (M.S.L., 1989). I am
grateful to Rosemary Burke, my research assistant, for excellent help on this article:
1. 0. W. HoiMEs, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Little, Brown & Co. 1963).
2. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv.
L. REv. 4, 5 (1983).
3. West, Jurisprudence As Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory,
60 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 145, 209 (1985).
4. See West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HAv. L. REv. 384 (1985).
5. West cites Bruce Ackerman's SociAL JusTcE m TEE LmERAL STATE (1980) and
Ronald Dworkin's TAxnlu RiGas SERIOUSLY (1977) as examples. See West, supra note 3, at
146 n.3.
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learn to become good lawyers and good people by reading stories about
good and bad lawyers and by measuring our imagined conduct against
theirs.6 For him, stories are ways of teaching professional responsibility and
of critiquing lawyers' moral conduct. I, too, have claimed that "narrative
helps to initiate us into our place in the law, whether as citizens or as
lawyers, ' 7 that stories are wellsprings from which we nourish and ennoble
our own lives.
Narrative jurisprudence seen in these ways serves to teach us about the
law and about ourselves,8 or it serves to help us explain our theories to
each other and to critique theories of law.9 Yet law and narrative are related
in other ways that have received less attention: the relationship of narrative
to doing and changing the law, not theory at all but practice. How does
storytelling figure in the day-to-day practice of the law? If our legal rules
are located in a narrative, whose narrative is it? How might those rules be
changed, especially if alternative stories are silenced by the very rules they
seek to change? For example, if a battered woman kills her abuser and
tries to plead self-defense, she may well find that the rules governing that
plea are embedded in a male narrative, a story of two men of equal size
confronting each other in an alley. Thus she has to demonstrate imminence,
equal force, and attempted retreat. Because her story is radically different
from the one that gave rise to the rules, she may well find the plea beyond
her reach. 10 And she might be prevented from telling her story at all because
it does not fit into the official version of self-defense. Until such unofficial
stories are heard and privileged, the traditional narrative retains its hegemony
in the law. Whether or not a judge allows the woman's story to be told,
and perhaps validated by a meta-story provided by expert testimony about
other women like her, may well determine the outcome of her trial.
Narrative thus constructs both social and legal meaning. The narrative
that gave rise to an act may determine whether an act of killing an abusive
spouse is murder or a tragic, but noncriminal, ending to an uncontrolled
domestic situation. Narrative looks first to the dominant social order and
superscribes on it the alternative social order; one is not more or less "real"
than the other. This is the power of narrative in the law. It does not ask
either/or; it allows for oppositions and a multitude of voices. It makes
room for dialogue and in the midst of the dialogue, transformation of legal
meaning can occur.
6. See T. SHAFFER, AmPiucAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics
(1985).
7. Phelps, Narratives of Disobedience: Breaking/Changing the Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC.
133, 136 (1990).
8. For the pedagogical uses of narrative in the law, see 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990)
for a symposium on the Pedagogy of Narrative.
9. For discussions of the theoretical uses of law and narrative, see the symposium on
Legal Storytelling at 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
10. See Phelps, Stories of Women in Self-Defense, 2 YALE J. OF LAW AND FEMiNISM 189
(1989).
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
The role of storytelling in the trial process was the subject of a study
conducted by W. Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman, in which they
concluded that the criminal trial is organized around storytelling. "Stories,"
they write, "are everyday communication devices that create interpretive
contexts for social action. In isolation from social context, behaviors or
actions are ambiguous." 1 Their study demonstrates that if defendants are
not allowed to tell their stories because of procedural devices or if defen-
dants' stories are not among those shared by their listeners, then injustice
may result because the defendants are not believed.' 2 These legal stories are
reconstructions of "what really happened," and the party doing the telling,
who controls the frame of the story, has a significant advantage over the
other participants in the trial. This is especially true if the storytelling is
controlled to the extent that only one story is told; dialogue is shut down
and the legal status quo remains.
Another way that narrative is related to the law is through its role in
bringing about change in the law. If legal rules and institutions are embedded
in narratives, then it will not be until the limitations of the narratives are
exposed that laws can be changed. Sometimes the only means by which the
underlying narratives are unmasked is by breaking the law, telling the story
of the law breaking and its underlying rationale, and challenging the
"official" story with a new one that has been silenced or unknown. Thus
narrative and civil disobedience are interlocked. This notion of narrative
and the law is associated, I think, with Robert Cover's description of law
as a bridge that connects reality to alternity, our actual legal system to an
imagined future world. If law is separated from narrative and reduced to
a system of rules, procedures, or syllogisms, it is stripped of its transfor-
mative powers and becomes, instead, an instrument of oppression. 3
This article is about these connections of narrative to doing and changing
the law. The article first argues that narrative is inescapably part of any
effective act of civil disobedience that seeks to change the law. Beyond that,
the article demonstrates that narrative is essential to judging acts of diso-
bedience to the law. To judge we must understand, and to understand we
must have context, the story in which the act is embedded. As an example
I discuss the Tucson Sanctuary Movement, 14 in which a struggle over who
controlled the narrative, both before and during the trial, is part of the
11. W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALrTY iN THE
COURTROOM 7 (1981).
12. Id. at 177.
13. See Cover, supra note 2; Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14
CAP. U.L. REV. 179 (1985); Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601 (1986).
14. A great deal has been written about the Sanctuary Movement, but nothing so far
has analyzed the events in Tucson from the standpoint of narrative jurisprudence. For other
discussions of the Movement, see I. BAU, Tis GROUND Is HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND
CENTRAL AMERiCAN REFUGEES (1985); A. CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN
CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW IN COLLISION (1988); M. DAVIDSON, CONVICTIONS OF THE HEART:
JIM COR9ETT AND THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1988); R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, SANC-
TUARY: THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1986).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:123
untold story. The role of narrative (and lack of it) takes center stage in
that legal drama.
NARRATIVE AND Civn. DIsOBEDIENCE
The lawbreaking that we call civil disobedience can take a number of
forms. It may be a symbolic act undertaken to call attention to a law or
government practice believed to be unjust. Denting nuclear weapons, throw-
ing blood on draft records, blocking entrance to the Pentagon, and sitting
in at a government official's office all exemplify symbolic acts of civil
disobedience. The laws broken are generally those prohibiting trespass on
or damage to government property, not the laws to which the lawbreakers
object. The act of lawbreaking, then, is incidental to the unjust law or
practice; since its purpose is to call attention to something, it explicitly
depends on narrative. When the story of the symbolic act is told (as it will
be by the participants and the press), the story of the unjust law must also
be told and other citizens may respond to that narrative. The official story
thereby is challenged and made vulnerable by a competing narrative.
Another form that civil disobedience may take is also symbolic but it
shares a nexus with the law or practice believed unjust: Thoreau's refusal
to pay a poll tax to support a government that waged war against Mexico
is an example. The law he was breaking-paying taxes-was not what he
wished changed, but there was a direct relationship between the two in that
his taxes went toWard supporting the war. While this kind of act may be
self-satisfying (and indeed some Americans quietly refused to pay taxes
during the Vietnam conflict), it has no impact on the law or practice unless
its story is told. Thoreau knew this and his essay "Civil Disobedience" told
the story of his lawbreaking so that others might follow his example or in
other ways protest the war. In a similar fashion, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
violation of the Birmingham injunction prohibiting parading was only
peripherally related to the system of segregation he wished changed. His
arrest and incarceration in Birmingham Jail would have failed to have the
necessary impact had he not written his "Letter From Birmingham City
Jail" and had the media not seen fit to give it wide coverage. His act of
defiance, with his story of it and his reasons for doing it, merged into a
potent weapon against segregation and the brutal police tactics enlisted to
enforce it."
A third form of civil disobedience involves actually breaking the law
wished changed. Rosa Parks' refusal to sit in the back of the bus in
Montgomery represents this form. Sometimes it may become symbolic as
well as direct, such as in Rosa Parks' case, in which that particular law
and all the Jim Crow laws of Alabama were the eventual target. Once
more, though, Rosa Parks' act would have been just another futile act of
15. See T. BRANCH, PARTNIG THE WATERS: AMERICA I THm KING YERs 1954-63 803-04
(1988).
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defiance to an unjust law had the story not been told. The Montgomery
NAACP saw to this first by persuading Parks to fight the charge and
thereby attract media attention, and second by beginning a widespread
publicity campaign of its own.
16
A fourth form of civil disobedience 17 involves a covert breaking of the
law in order to help those placed in danger by a government law or practice.
Operators of the Underground Railroad quietly broke the fugitive slave laws
to assist slaves in escaping, hiding from authorities, and finding places to
live in freedom. The very secrecy was crucial to its operation, as abolitionists
fought on other more public fronts to end slavery. The Underground
Railroad, for all the necessary humanitarian work it accomplished, was not
intended to change the law and thus had a piecemeal, band-aid quality to
it. It was lawbreaking without an accompanying narrative and thereby not
effective in the evolution of the law.
This is the situation in which the Tucson sanctuary workers operated
until 1982. Until that time they had quietly assisted refugees from Central
America to enter the United States and to find homes and work, with or
without the official sanction of the United States Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service. This kind of lawbreaking, however, suffers from the very
secrecy it engenders. 8 The underlying law or practice remains unchanged
unless the lawbreakers come out and tell the story of what they are doing
and why.
THE TucsoN SANcTuARY STORY
In March, 1982, the Sanctuary Movement in Tucson, Arizona moved
from the fourth form of civil disobedience, covert humanitarian lawbreak-
ing, to the third form, lawbreaking with an accompanying narrative designed
16. Id. at 128-42.
17. Some would argue that only public acts of breaking the law are properly called civil
disobedience. John Rawls defines civil disobedience as a "public, non-violent, and conscientious
act contrary to law usually done with the intent to bring about a change in the policies or
laws of the government." Rawls, The Justification of Civil Disobedience, in REVOLUTioN A
TBE RuLr op LAw 36 (E. Kent ed. 1971). I prefer to see civil disobedience as breaking a law
believed to be unjust, thus defining it according to the motive behind it rather than by its
public or private nature Sqe, e.g., Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory
and Civil Disobedience, 18 GA. L. R-v. 929 (1984). In this way, those who break unjust laws
and do not seek publicity or punishment may call their acts civil disobedience.
18. But see Pirie, The Origins of a Political Trial: The Sanctuary Movement and Political
Justice, 2 YALE J. op LAw AND THE Hum rms 381, 382 (1990), in which she writes:
But this failure [to have ameliorating effect on immigration policies and practices]
does not mean that these [sanctuaryl efforts were only significant as stop-gap or
band-aid measures. Sanctuary participation taught people about certain political,
religious, and legal realities from which they formed new perceptions about their
world, their responsibility, and possibilities for action.
Id. I can agree with this in that what I call the fourth form of civil disobedience-covert
humanitarian aid-prepares its participants for the third form-open political confrontation.
Indeed Pirie sees the Sanctuary Movement's shift from private to public as a move from
purely religious to political action. Id.
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to change the law. Before then it had operated much like the Underground
Railroad. 19 The sanctuary movement was conceived by the Reverend John
Fife of the Southside United Presbyterian Church in Tucson and Jim
Corbett, a retired Quaker Rancher. 2 In May 1981, a friend of Corbett's
had picked up a Salvadoran refugee hitchhiker. The Border Patrol had
stopped Corbett's friend and arrested the Salvadoran. The following day,
Corbett had his first contact with the Border Patrol and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), both of which refused to give him any
information about the detainee. Using subterfuge, Corbett was able to
obtain the name of the detainee and his location. He arrived at the Santa
Cruz County Jail with the appropriate forms, was asked to wait for a long
time, and finally learned that the Border Patrol had removed the detainee
"20 or 30 minutes ago. They're gone." 21
At about the same time, the Tucson Ecumenical Council (TEC) created
a task force on Central America to respond to the needs of Central
Americans entering the country. The task force began by raising bail to
bond aliens out of detention and to assist with legal fees. After raising
close to one million dollars, the TEC began to realize that bonding out was
ineffective.22
The turning point for Corbett came in late June when he escorted three
men into the INS office in Tucson for the purpose of filing for asylum.
All three men were arrested, and bond was set at an unprecedented $3000.2
3
Corbett had come to realize that using the legal system would nearly
invariably result in deportation of Central Americans.? Giving up on the
19. The Sanctuary Movement's similarity to the Underground Railroad has been widely
recognized. Perhaps the most notable comparison appears in what can only be seen as a kind
of Freudian slip in the Ninth Circuit opinion upholding the convictions. Judge Hall wrote,
"[a]ppellants were convicted of masterminding and running a modern-day underground railroad
that smuggled Central American natives across the border with Arizona." United States v.
Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1989).
20. I. BAu, supra note 14, at 10.
21. M. DAvDsoN, supra note 14, at 12-22; see also A. CsRnDaEN, supra note 14, at
28-30.
22. I. BAU, supra note 14, at 10.
23. A. CRTNDEN, supra note 14, at 52-54.
24. Although 1980 Refugee Act was designed to offer a wide range of humanitarian
responses to refugee crisis situations and to strip immigration policies of ideological bias, post
Act figures belie these intentions. In 1983, for example, 78% of the Russian, 64% of the
Ethiopian, 53% of the Afghan, and 44% of the Romanian cases decided received asylum. For
those fleeing non-Communist countries, asylum was far less likely: 11% of the Philippine,
12% of the Pakistani, 2% of the Haitian, 2% of the Guatemalan, and 3% of the Salvadoran
cases received favorable decisions. See Rodino, A Symposium on the Sanctuary Movement:
Introduction, 15 HOFSTRA L. Ray. 1, 2-3 (1986). The government regularly regards refugees
from most Central American countries (Nicaragua is a notable exception) as economic refugees
and thus ineligible for asylum under the 1980 Act. For both sides of the discussion about the
implementation of the 1980 Act, see SANCTUARY: CHALLENGE TO Ta CnURcHcs (M. H.
Thomas ed. 1986). See also A. CRrTENDEN, supra note 14, at 18, in which she states that
90% of the 2 million refugees admitted outside of normal immigration procedures since World
War II were from Communist countries. She also provides admissions statistics covering a
number of years. Id. at 20-21.
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INS, ife began to help Central Americans enter the United States without
government sanction.
In late October, Corbett received a letter from the Reverend John
Wagner, director of the Lutheran Social Services of Southern California,
describing an event at a Los Angeles church. INS officers had pursued a
man into the church and taken him away. After church representatives
protested, INS officers agreed not to pursue those who had entered a
church, hospital, or school. Wagner proposed that the agreement recognized
church as sanctuary.2s The very word "sanctuary," rooted in long biblical
tradition, implies that a religious practice trumps the civil law; that those
who would offer sanctuary are not breaking the law but are instead
presenting an acceptable alternative to those in need.2 6 Corbett suggested
the idea of using churches as sanctuary to the TEC task force, and Fife
volunteered to speak to the members of his congregation for the purpose
of creating sanctuary at Southside.2 7
At its annual meeting in January, 1982, Southside decided to declare
public sanctuary. Joining it were five churches in the San Francisco Bay
area, and three other churches.28 The date for the declaration was set for
March 24, 1982, the second anniversary of the assassination of Archbishop
Oscar Romero of El Salvador. On the day before the declaration, Fife sent
a letter to Attorney General William French Smith, with copies to A. Melvin
McDonald, United States Attorney, Arizona; William Johnston, Immigra-
tion Service, Tucson; and Leon Ring, Border Patrol, Tucson, which said:
We are writing to inform you that Southside United Presbyterian
Church will publicly violate the Immigration and Naturalization
Act, Section 274 (A)....
We take this action because we believe the current policy and
practice of the United States Government with regard to Central
American refugees is illegal and immoral. We believe our govern-
25. M. DAvEDsoN, supra note 14, at 66-67.
26. The biblical basis for sanctuary is Numbers 35:6-34, establishing cities of refuge for
"manslayers" who killed without intent. While in the city of refuge, the individual was
protected from the vengeance of the next-of-kin of the person slain. If the fugitive left the
city of refuge, he lost its protection. In the earliest Anglo-Saxon legal code, a distinction
between the church's peace and the king's peace was established. The king's peace was a
protection granted by the king to any free man, but the church's peace was a protection
granted by the church and attached to sacred places. The penalty for violating the church's
peace was double the violation of the king's peace. The first express grant of asylum appears
in 887, allowing asylum in a monastery for three days and penalties for anyone who violated
the sanctuary of the Church. By the fourteenth century, the person who sought sanctuary was
seeking protection from prosecution, rather than personal vengeance by family members. The
fugitive had a choice of submitting to trial or abjuring the realm. Sanctuary protection lasted
at least forty days during which time the fugitive could make his decision. If he decided to
leave the country, the protection followed him to the borders. For an overview of the history
of sanctuary, see I. Bau, supra note 14, at 124-71.
27. M. DAvmsoN, supra note 14, at 67.
28. Id. at 68; A. CRsrr mmq, supra note 14, at 69.
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ment is in violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and international law
by continuing to arrest, detain, and forcibly return refugees to the
terror, persecution, and murder in El Salvador and Guatemala .... 29
By going public, the sanctuary workers began to tell the story of what they
had been doing since the summer of 1981.30 As a result, they soon were
joined by many other congregations and began to receive the support of
religious leaders throughout the country.3' And they knew just what they
were doing: Jim Corbett said that they had gone public because "we had
all become aware that a full-scale holocaust was going on in Central
America, and by keeping the operation clandestine we were doing exactly
what the government wanted us to do-keep it hidden, keeping the issue
out of the public view. ' '3 2 Leaders of the movement began to encourage
interviews by the news media and even allowed television cameras to follow
them as they transported refugees."3 Only by presenting a competing nar-
rative that exposed the ideological bias in the implementation of the 1980
Refugee Act and the conditions in Central America could the sanctuary
- movement hope to change the law. What they did was only a small part
of the story; why they did it was the crucial part.
Even after the public declaration, the government was slow to act, still
seeing the sanctuary movement as less than "a serious threat to enforcement
efforts ... when viewed in its overall context." 3 4 Moreover, the government
was aware that arrests would only bring more publicity to the movement,
and the story told would be controlled by the sanctuary workers themselves.
The drama of their arrests and trials would give their story a widespread,
and perhaps sympathetic, audience. To effectively undercut the sanctuary
movement, the government had not only to use the criminal law to stop
individuals from their activities, but also had to grab control of the story
that was being told. The former without the latter would only cause more
harm to law enforcement efforts, and would, in fact, play into the hands
of the sanctuary movement. The more the sanctuary workers could publicize
their activities, the more they could draw attention to the unjust implemen-
tation of the 1980 Refugee Act, and others might rally to the cause,
demanding change.
29. A. CRrrTENDEN, supra note 14, at 74.
30. R. GomND & M. McCoNza, supra note 14, at 48.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 47.
33. Trial Pitting U.S. Against Sanctuary Movement, L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 1985, at 10,
col. 1; see also United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 1989). Stories about the
movement were featured in PEoPLE, U.S. NEws AND WoLD Rs'oRT and on 60 Minutes. See
M. DAVmSON, supra note 14, at 111 (describing PEoPLE magazine story).
34. Memorandum from Dean B. Thatcher, Intelligence Agent, to Robert D. McCord,
Chief Patrol Agent; James Rayburn, Criminal Investigator; William Glenn, Regional Inteli-
gence Western Region; John Camp, Central Office Intelligence Central Office (Jan. 4, 1983)
(quoted in Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury, 15 HoFsA L. Rav. 5, 43
n.203 (1986)). Despite its apparent inactivity, however, the INS opened a file on the sanctuary
movement just two days after the public declaration. L.A. Times, supra note 33.
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT
Two years after the public declaration, in March 1984, the government
risked playing into the movement's hands and issued indictments against
several sanctuary workers in Texas." The indicted sanctuary workers ex-
ploited the opportunity to attract media coverage and held a press confer-
ence. John Elder, one of the arrested, said: "As a member of the sanctuary
community... I am proud to be able to live my life in a way that allows
my own alleged criminal actions to illuminate our nation's shameful poli-
cies." 36 Another, Stacy Merkt, said: "What motivates me to help people
and to work for justice is my belief in a God of life and love. I have seen.
I have heard. I don't need five hundred thousand more refugees to convince
me that we act illegally when we deport refugees."
37
This narrative of civil disobedience was clearly controlled by the sanc-
tuary workers. Those that the government preferred to call "undocumented
aliens" were renamed "refugees," a critical renaming that could reconstruct
legal meaning under the 1980 Act.3" "Refugees" received asylum; undocu-
mented "aliens" were deported. The definition, however, can only come
from the story of what the conditions are in the person's homeland and
35. Stacey Lynn Merkt was a worker at Casa Oscar Romero in San Benito, Texas, an
organization providing food, shelter and assistance to Central Americans. She was arrested in
February, 1984, and at trial was found guilty of conspiring to transport and move, and
transporting and moving, two illegal aliens within the United States. Her conviction was
reversed and remanded on appeal based on an improper jury instruction. United States v.
Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). John B. Elder, director
of Casa Oscar Romero, was arrested in March 1984 after Border Patrol agents witnessed three
Salvadorans leaving Elders's vehicle in front of the local bus station. He was accused of
unlawfully transporting undocumented aliens. Several motions to dismiss were filed, based on
free exercise of religion, domestic and international law, selective prosecution, and estoppel.
The District Court denied all motions to dismiss. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574
(S.D. Tex. 1985). In a trial by jury, Elder was acquitted. See A. Crittenden, supra note 14,
at 252 n.*. Both Elder and Merkt were again indicted in December 1984 for illegally transporting
undocumented aliens. Elder was convicted of two counts of conspiracy, two counts of bringing
in and landing illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), and two counts of
transporting illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). United States v. Merkt, 794
F.2d 950, 953 (5th Cir. 1986). Although Merkt was indicted on one conspiracy count and two
transportation counts, she was convicted on the conspiracy count alone. Id. at 954. On appeal
to the Fifth Circuit, the convictions were affimed. Id. at 965. Elder served 133 days of a 150
day sentence in a half-way house. Merkt served her time, while pregnant, in Texas. A.
CRrrrm;DmN, supra note 14, at 252 n.*.
36. R. GoLDEw & M. McCoNNnu., supra note 14, at 74.
37. Id. at 73.
38. The 1980 Refugee Act was intended to bring United States law into conformity with
the 1967 United Nations Protocol to which the United States became a signatory in 1968. The
Protocol defined "refugee" as a person who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted"
based on "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion." See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise,
17 Mci. J. LAw REFopm 243, 246 (1984). Between 1968 and 1980, this standard was not
used uniformly; courts sometimes used it and at other times reverted to the earlier "clear
probability of persecution" standard. During this time, the Attorney General used his parole
power to admit 7,150 refugees from non-Communist countries and 608,385 from Communist
countries. Id. at 248.
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what he or she has suffered there. The new story inverted the civil order
by depicting the government's deportations as illegal and the movement's
work as a lawful and necessary response to unjust government policies,
answering the call of God. This is precisely the power of narratives that
chronicle acts of civil disobedience; they are meant to invert the order, to
redefine lawful and unlawful, and to determine the names by which things
are called. They are meant to bring about a change in the law by rallying
others to the cause and to expose the unjust law or practices that should
be changed.
The strategy was working, at least in part, by attracting others to the
movement, although INS policies remained the same. By January 1985,
nearly two hundred churches in eleven cities had publicly declared sanctu-
ary,39 and sanctuary workers were openly defying the law. If the government
was to do anything about the sanctuary movement, it had to move. But
the government faced a dilemma: on the one hand, further arrests and trials
would only serve the movement's interests by attracting more publicity and
giving those on trial a stage on which to present their claims that they were
acting lawfully and that the INS, in keeping with the foreign policy aspi-
rations of the Reagan administration, was unlawfully implementing the
terms of the 1980 Refugee Act. On the other hand, if the government
continued to look the other way in the face of the sanctuary movement's
open defiance of the law, respect for the law would be undermined to the
extent that it would be rendered impotent. The worst case scenario would
be arrests that attracted the media and provided a platform for the sanctuary
story to be told, a trial that furthered these ends, and acquittals that would
give official citizen sanction to the sanctuary movement. The order would
not then be represented as inverted; it would be inverted. The government's
hands were tied unless it could find a way to seize control of the story.
TAKiNG CONTmOL OF THE STORY
On January 14, 1985, sixteen4 people were indicted, charged under 8
U.S.C. section 1324 for engaging in a conspiracy to violate immigration
statutes. With the sealed indictment, the government filed a motion in limine
and a supporting memorandum of law in which the government asked the
trial court not to allow the admission of four defenses: defenses based upon
international law, freedom of religion, the law of necessity, and lack of
specific criminal intent.41 After nine months in which both sides filed
39. Kemper, Convicted of the Gospel, SojouNE, July 1986, at 14.
40. Of the original sixteen, eleven stood trial and eight were convicted. Colbert, supra
note 34, at 6 n.1.
41. The motion in limine did much else besides silencing the defense. It effectively shifted
the burden of proving guilt from the prosecution to the defense before the trial began. In
essence the defense team had to lay out its strategy before trial and convince the court that it
should be permitted to use the defenses. This curtailed the defendants' right to remain silent,
to be free from self-incrimination, and to insist that the prosecution bear the burden of proving
guilt. Colbert, supra note 34, at 69-76. Professor Colbert's exceint article thoroughly discusses
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additional memoranda and engaged in extensive discovery, United States
District Judge Earl H. Carroll granted the motion, making it clear that he
considered the trial to be an "alien-smuggling case." 42 The government thus
effectively circumscribed the bounds of the story that could be told at trial:
the story that was left to be heard by the jury characterized the events in
Tucson as the activities of "nothing more than an alien smuggling ring." 43
And the government was not reticent about its tactics, stating that it did
not want the trial turned "into an evaluation by the jury of competing
horror stories." 44 Nor did it want the foreign policy of the Reagan Admin-
istration put on trial, stating that its main concern was that the trial not
be "convert[ed] ... into a political stage to advance the defendants'
symposium on Central American conflicts. ' 45 By using a rule of procedure,
the government silenced all but the story it wished to tell and reinverted
the order upset by the publicity surrounding the sanctuary movement.
"Refugees" were once again "aliens," and no evidence that would suggest
otherwise could be heard. The sanctuary workers had always claimed that
they had acted lawfully and that the INS was acting unlawfully by manip-
ulating the terms of the 1980 Refugee Act and ignoring the requirements
of international law. By seizing charge of the story, the government shut
down that claim by disallowing evidence that would show government
malfeasance. It controlled the names by which people and events were
known.
On October 28, 1985, the District Court summarized its rulings:
1. No evidence will be received offered in support of or in op-
position to the wisdom of any government policy or regarding
any political question respecting a foreign country.
2. No evidence will be received offered to demonstrate that there
was or is civil strife, lawlessness or danger to civilians in any
foreign country.
3. No evidence will be received offered to establish good or bad
motive on the part of a defendant or defendants.
4. No evidence of religious beliefs will be received as a defense to
the charges in the indictment.
5. No evidence will be received offered to prove either necessity
or duress on the part of any defendant for the surreptitious
entry of an alien into the United States.46
these effects of the motion in limine and as well provides a history of the previous uses of
the motion. He concludes that the exclusion of entire defenses is not the proper use of a
motion in limine at a criminal trial. Id. at 76.
42. L.A. Times, supra note 33.
43. Colbert, supra note 34, at 52 n.247.
44. Id. at 52 n.251.
45. Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Government's Motion
in Limine, United States v. Aguilar, No. Cr. 85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 1985)
(cited in Colbert, supra note 34, at 51).
46. United States v. Aguilar, No. Cr. 85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 1985) (cited
in Colbert, supra note 34, at 54, n.270).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:123
The court also excluded evidence as to the defendants' belief that the aliens
involved were refugees and the defendants' understanding of the immigration
laws of the United States. 47 These, then, are the stories that were silenced:
the government's policy toward Central American aliens, the conditions in
El Salvador and Guatemala, the defendants' motives and religious beliefs,
the defendants' understanding of the 1980 Refugee Act, and the defendants'
understanding of the immigration laws of the United States.
Piece by piece, the opportunities to give context to the defendants' acts
were removed by the motion in limine. If the defendants could not offer
testimony about the INS's implementation of the 1980 Refugee Act, which
tended to treat all Central Americans as economic migrantse eligible only
for deportation, and they could not testify as to their own understanding
of the 1980 Act and international law, they could not establish their basic
premise-one known to the authorities since the 1982 letter from the
Southside congregation to William French Smith-that the government, not
the defendants, was violating the law. They had lost the means by which
they might invert the order.
If the defendants could not offer testimony, general or specific, about
the conditions that drove the Central Americans northward, they could not
change the designation "alien" to the designation "refugee." To be entitled,
in fact, to that designation, one must show a "well-founded fear of
persecution." To show that, one must be able to tell the story of the
persecution. If they could not testify about their motives or'religious beliefs,
the "why" of their acts was removed, leaving only the bare, seemingly
illegal, "what." Law was stripped of narrative and reduced to syllogism.
By shutting down any dialogue concerning these issues, the government
hoped to deprive the defendants of the means by which the law might be
transformed. Law may be transformed through dialogue, where competing
representation of truth challenge each other. In the absence of dialogue,
with the silencing of anyone's "word," dominating conditions are main-
tained and change curtailed. 49
Don Reno, special assistant Attorney General who was prosecuting the
case, fully knew the implications of the motion; he intended to isolate the
defendants' actions from any context that would give them meaning. He
had been a criminal defense lawyer for years before he changed sides and
he knew that the way to vindicate criminals was to give context to their
actions.5 0 Throughout the trial, he, with the full compliance of Judge Carroll,
47. Id.
48. This attitude was handed down from Washington. In April 1985, the United States
Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings as to whether Salvadorans could be granted extended
voluntary departure, a process that would allow them to stay in the United States indefinitely.
The official government position was stated by Elliott Abrams, then Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs: Salvadorans fled to the United States for
economic reasons, not because of political persecution. M. DAvmsoN, supra note 14, at 99.
49. See P. FRnix, PEDAGoGy OF THm OPPRESSED (1968) at 77ff.
50. A. CErrTENDEN, supra note 14, at 218-19.
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completely controlled what words were used and what stories were told. In
his opening statement to the jury, Reno carefully kept religion out of the
courtroom, "even to the extent of referring to Sister Darlene Nicgorski, a
Phoenix nun, as Miss Nicgorski.' 15 He described the work of the sanctuary
movement as a "criminal enterprise," that brought illegal aliens into the
country and provided them with disguises and false documents.12 He named
the TEC task force a "three-tiered smuggling conspiracy" and Socorro
Aguilar's house a "drop house, in alien-smuggling parlance." 53 When the
defense attorneys asked Judge Carroll for an opportunity to recharacterize
events and people, he would not allow it, saying it went to motive, an
argument expressly disallowed by the motion in limine.
One of the Salvadorans helped by two of the defendants, Alejandro
Rodriguez, was arrested out of the sanctuary church in Rochester, New
York, where he and his family were living. He was required to testify for
the prosecution, specifically identifying Aguilar and Conger, the two who
had helped him. He, like many others, had been named an "illegal alien
unindicted co-conspirator." 54 If he refused to testify, he would be deported.
When he was called to the witness stand, the judge immediately labelled
him a hostile witness, allowing the prosecution to ask leading questions.
Any attempt he made to explain why he fled El Salvador was stricken from
the record. The judge would allow "political persecution" but not "tor-
ture." He could express "concern for his safety" but was not allowed to
talk about death squads or murdered relatives.
Finally the defense asked that Rodriguez be allowed to tell his story
out of the jury's hearing. After the jury left the courtroom, the court and
the courtroom audience heard Rodriguez's story. He was an El Salvadoran
of some economic means, who owned a house and a farm, who was a
labor organizer, who had been arrested without charges and tortured for
fifteen days. After six months in prison, he was released after a North
American business associate inquired about him. When he returned to his
house, he found a death squad waiting for him. He fled to Mexico where
he was later joined by his wife and children. He took his family with him,
he testified, because "in El Salvador, they murder three-month old babies.
They rape girls that are five, six, seven years old. Their vengeance would
have been their kidnapping, raping, or murdering my children." 55
The defense lawyers pleaded with the judge to allow Rodriguez to tell
his story to the jury. "Otherwise," they said, "you rob him of his story
and rob the jury of the chance to know the truth." "I have that discretion
under the law,'! Carroll commented, and denied the request.56
51. L.A. Times, supra note 33, at 10.
52. Id.
53. M. DAviDsON, supra note 14, at 114.
54. Id. at 94.
55. Id. at 125.
56. J. McDArEL, SANcTuARY: A JouRNEY 135-37 (1987). For other stories that were all
or partially silenced, see M. DAVImSON, supra note 14, at 125-28.
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When the prosecution completed its case, the defense rested without
calling a single witness.5 7 While the motives may have been mixed, 8 the
basic feeling was that Judge Carroll had made it clear that he would not
allow them to present their case. Fife put it succinctly: "The Bible says,
when there is no opportunity to speak for the truth, then stand silent." 5 9
They felt that an incomplete story could not be the truth.
On May 1, 1986, the jury returned its verdict: guilty on eighteen of the
thirty counts that Reno had given them.6° Despite the widespread sympathetic
publicity that the trial had generated for the sanctuary movement, the
government won the battle over guilt; its strategy of silencing stories had
been temporarily victorious.
CONCLUSION
Although I began by showing the fragmented nature of what we call
narrative jurisprudence, the end of my story must return to the similarities.
All narratives associated with the law- whether they be theoretical, peda-
gogical, or practical-allow us to compare what is with what can be and
to compare what we know with what we do not know. Like the theoretical
and pedagogical versions of narrative jurisprudence, narratives about doing
and changing the law are a bridge from reality to alternity, or from what
we think is real to a new version of reality. Without hearing new narratives,
we cannot hope to change the law; our imagined worlds remain beyond our
reach.
The real tragedy in Tucson is not the guilty verdicts, but that our
government had to resort to silencing stories to get them. The government's
strategy won a small and temporary victory, for nothing can finally halt
storytelling. The new narrative superimposed upon the story of the sanctuary
57. The defense had taken every opportunity to get as much in during cross-examination
as Judge Carroll would allow. Bits and pieces of stories of conditions in El Salvador and of
the INS detention process in the United States had managed to slip in. See M. DAvmsoN,
supra note 14, at 115-46.
58. Some defense attorneys believed that the prosecution had not proved its case and
that presenting a defense could give Reno an opportunity to say even more. M. DAVEDSON,
supra note 14, at 143.
59. Id. at 144.
60. Eight of the defendants were convicted of violating various sections of 8 U.S.C. §
1324 including conspiracy, harboring aliens, unlawful transportation of aliens, aiding and
abetting unlawful entry of aliens. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 666-67 (9th Cir.
1989). On appeal, the defendant-appellants raised the issues argued in the motion in limine.
In upholding the convictions, the court held, inter alia, a mistake of law defense was not
available based on the defendants' misunderstanding of the aliens legal status, a necessity
defense was not available based on allegations that the INS frustrated the defendants' attempts
to establish legal status for the aliens, a First Amendment defense was not available because
religious motivation is irrelevant to the intention of furthering an alien's illegal presence. Id.
at 673, 690, 687. The court in its opinion consistently characterized the Central Americans as
"aliens," language that was critical to its decision. It disallowed any testimony or evidence
that may have challenged this characterization.
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movement and the story of the trial in Tucson is the story of the motion
in limine and of the government's misuse of it. Perhaps this new story will
finally move us to action. This is the difference between narrative and logic;
stories change people's minds. "We need words in law to learn the sins as
well as the glories of the past, to give voice to current conflicts, and to
retell and recreate our own myths." ' 6' So, too, do we need stories.
ANOTER CONCLUSION
The government was right to fear stories. The stories that the "undo-
cumented aliens" were telling people in churches around the country about
what had happened to them in El Salvador were beginning to move people's
hearts and minds, beginning, perhaps, to make us call our government to
account. I had hoped to write this article about narrative and the law in
an unbiased fashion; I tried, unsuccessfully it turns out, not to take sides.
In doing the necessary background research for this article, I read many
stories told by Central Americans. The government was right to fear stories.
I will never be the same.
61. Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 873 (1986).
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